substitutional compression - definizione. Che cos'è substitutional compression
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Cosa (chi) è substitutional compression - definizione

ALTERNATIVE TO TARSKIAN SEMANTICS PRIMARILY CHAMPIONED BY RUTH BARCAN MARCUS
Substitutional quantification

lossy         
DATA COMPRESSION APPROACH THAT RESULTS IN LOSS OR CHANGE OF SOME DATA
Lossy; Lossy encoding; Lossy data compression; Data compression/lossy; List of lossy compression methods; Irreversible compression
<algorithm> A term describing a data compression algorithm which actually reduces the amount of information in the data, rather than just the number of bits used to represent that information. The lost information is usually removed because it is subjectively less important to the quality of the data (usually an image or sound) or because it can be recovered reasonably by interpolation from the remaining data. MPEG and JPEG are examples of lossy compression techniques. Opposite: lossless. (1995-03-29)
Compression artifact         
  • Example of datamoshing
  • Video glitch art
  • Illustration of the effect of JPEG compression on a slightly noisy image with a mixture of text and whitespace. Text is a screen capture from a Wikipedia conversation with noise added (intensity 10 in Paint.NET). One frame of the animation was saved as a JPEG (quality 90) and reloaded. Both frames were then zoomed by a factor of 4 (nearest neighbor interpolation).
  • Example of image with artifacts due to a transmission error
  • Loss of edge clarity and tone "fuzziness" in heavy [[JPEG]] compression
  • Block coding artifacts in a JPEG image. Flat blocks are caused by coarse quantization. Discontinuities at transform block boundaries are visible.
NOTICEABLE DISTORTION OF MEDIA CAUSED BY THE APPLICATION OF LOSSY DATA COMPRESSION
Compression artefact; Compression artifacts; Block artifact; JPEG artifacts; JPEG artifact; Compression artefacts; JPEG compression artifacts; Mosquito noise; Datamoshing; Datamosh; JPEG artefacts; Mosquito artifact; JPEG artefact; Jpg artifacting; Jpeg artefacts; JPG artefacting; Lossy compression artefact; Lossy compression artifact; Data moshing; Video compression artifact; Image compression artifact; Artifact (compression)
A compression artifact (or artefact) is a noticeable distortion of media (including images, audio, and video) caused by the application of lossy compression. Lossy data compression involves discarding some of the media's data so that it becomes small enough to be stored within the desired disk space or transmitted (streamed) within the available bandwidth (known as the data rate or bit rate).
lossy         
DATA COMPRESSION APPROACH THAT RESULTS IN LOSS OR CHANGE OF SOME DATA
Lossy; Lossy encoding; Lossy data compression; Data compression/lossy; List of lossy compression methods; Irreversible compression
¦ adjective
1. having or involving dissipation of electrical or electromagnetic energy.
2. Computing (of data compression) in which unnecessary information is discarded.

Wikipedia

Truth-value semantics

In formal semantics, truth-value semantics is an alternative to Tarskian semantics. It has been primarily championed by Ruth Barcan Marcus, H. Leblanc, and J. Michael Dunn and Nuel Belnap. It is also called the substitution interpretation (of the quantifiers) or substitutional quantification.

The idea of these semantics is that a universal (respectively, existential) quantifier may be read as a conjunction (respectively, disjunction) of formulas in which constants replace the variables in the scope of the quantifier. For example, ∀xPx may be read (Pa & Pb & Pc &...) where a, b, c are individual constants replacing all occurrences of x in Px.

The main difference between truth-value semantics and the standard semantics for predicate logic is that there are no domains for truth-value semantics. Only the truth clauses for atomic and for quantificational formulas differ from those of the standard semantics. Whereas in standard semantics atomic formulas like Pb or Rca are true if and only if (the referent of) b is a member of the extension of the predicate P, respectively, if and only if the pair (c, a) is a member of the extension of R, in truth-value semantics the truth-values of atomic formulas are basic. A universal (existential) formula is true if and only if all (some) substitution instances of it are true. Compare this with the standard semantics, which says that a universal (existential) formula is true if and only if for all (some) members of the domain, the formula holds for all (some) of them; for example, x A {\displaystyle \forall xA} is true (under an interpretation) if and only if for all k in the domain D, A(k/x) is true (where A(k/x) is the result of substituting k for all occurrences of x in A). (Here we are assuming that constants are names for themselves—i.e. they are also members of the domain.)

Truth-value semantics is not without its problems. First, the strong completeness theorem and compactness fail. To see this consider the set {F(1), F(2),...}. Clearly the formula x F ( x ) {\displaystyle \forall xF(x)} is a logical consequence of the set, but it is not a consequence of any finite subset of it (and hence it is not deducible from it). It follows immediately that both compactness and the strong completeness theorem fail for truth-value semantics. This is rectified by a modified definition of logical consequence as given in Dunn and Belnap 1968.

Another problem occurs in free logic. Consider a language with one individual constant c that is nondesignating and a predicate F standing for 'does not exist'. Then x F x {\displaystyle \exists xFx} is false even though a substitution instance (in fact every such instance under this interpretation) of it is true. To solve this problem we simply add the proviso that an existentially quantified statement is true under an interpretation for at least one substitution instance in which the constant designates something that exists.